Is the U.S. budget deficit sustainable?
The U.S. federal budget deficit for 2018 came in just shy of $800 billion, or about 4% of the gross domestic product (the primary deficit, which excludes the interest expense of the debt, was about 3% of GDP).
As the figure above
shows, the present level of deficit spending (as a ratio of GDP) is not too far
off from where has been in the 1970s and 1980s. It's also not too far off from
where it was in the early 2000s (although, the peaks back then were associated
with recessions).
Of course, the question people are asking is whether deficits of this magnitude
can be sustained into the foreseeable future without economic consequences
(like higher inflation). In this post, I suggest that the answer to this
question is yes, but just barely. If I am correct, then any new government
expenditure program will have to come at the expense of some other program, or
be funded through higher taxes. Let me explain my reasoning.
The Arithmetic of Government Spending and Finance
I begin with some basic arithmetic (I describe here where theory
comes in). Let G denote government expenditures and
let T denote government tax revenue. Then the primary
deficit is defined as S = G - T ( if S < 0,
then we have a primary surplus ). The absolute magnitudes involved
have little meaning--it turns out to be more useful to measure a growing
deficit relative to the size of a growing economy. Let Y denote the
gross domestic product (the total income generated in the economy). The
deficit-to-GDP ratio is then given by (S/Y). In what follows, I will
assume that this ratio is expected to remain constant over the indefinite
future (this is what a "sustainable" budget deficit means.)
Let D denote the outstanding stock of government "debt."
For countries that issue debt representing claims to their own currency and
permit their currency to float in foreign exchange markets, attaching the label
"debt" to these objects--like U.S. Treasury securities--is somewhat
misleading. The better analog in this case is equity. Companies that finance acquisitions
or expenditure through equity do not have to worry about bankruptcy. They may
have to worry about diluting the value of existing shareholders if they
over-issue equity, or use it to finance negative NPV projects. The same is true
of the U.S. federal government (but not state or local governments). The risk
of over-issuing treasury debt is not default--it is share dilution (i.e.,
inflation).
Let R denote the gross yield on debt (so that R -
1 is the net interest rate). If we interpret D as
currency, then R = 1 (currency has a zero net yield). If we
interpret D as U.S. Treasury debt, then R = 1.025 (UST debt
has an average net yield of around 2.5%). Note that in some jurisdictions
today, government debt has a negative yield (so, R < 1 )
-- that is, government "debt" is in this case an income-generating
asset!
Alright, back to the arithmetic. Let D' denote the stock of debt
inherited from the previous period that is due interest today. The interest
expense of this debt is given by (R - 1)D' (the interest expense of
currency is zero). The primary deficit plus interest expense must be financed
with new debt D - D', where D represents the stock of debt today
and D' represents the stock of debt yesterday. Our simple arithmetic
tells us that the following must be true:
[1] S + (R - 1)D' = D - D'
Let me rewrite [1] as:
[2] S = D - RD'
Now, let's divide through by Y in [2] to get:
[3] (S/Y) = (D/Y) - R(D'/Y)
We're almost there. Notice that (D'/Y) = (D'/Y')(Y'/Y). [I want to say
that this is just high school math...except that my son came to me the
other night with a homework question I could not answer. If you're not good at
math, I understand your pain. But if you need some help, don't be afraid to ask
someone. Like my son, for example.]
Define n = (Y/Y'), the (gross) rate at which the nominal GDP grows over
time. In my calculations below, I'm going to assume n = 1.05, that is 5%
growth. Implicitly, I'm assuming 2-3% real growth and 2-3% inflation, but I
don't think what I have to say below depends on what is driving NGDP growth. In
any case, let's combine (D'/Y) = (D'/Y')(Y'/Y) and n =
(Y/Y') with [3] to form:
[4] (S/Y) = (D/Y) - (R/n)(D'/Y')
One last step: assume that the debt-to-GDP ratio remains constant over time;
i.e., (D'/Y') = (D/Y). Again, I impose this condition to
characterize what is "sustainable." Combining this stationarity
condition with [4] yields:
[*] (S/Y) = [1 - R/n ](D/Y)
Condition [*] says that the deficit-to-GDP ratio is proportional to the the
debt-to-GDP ratio, with the factor of proportionality given by [1 - R/n
]. This latter object is positive if R < n and negative
if R > n.
The Mainstream View
There is no such thing as "the" mainstream view, of course. But I
think it's fair to say that in thinking about the sustainability of government
budget deficits, many economists implicitly assume that R > n. In this
case, condition [*] says that if the outstanding stock of government debt is
positive (D > 0), then sustainable deficits are impossible. Indeed, what is
needed is a sustainable primary budget surplus to service the
interest expense of the debt.
The condition R > n is a perfectly reasonable assumption for any
entity that does not control or influence the money supply: state and local
governments, emerging economies that issue dollar-denominated debt, EMU
countries that issue debt in euros, federal governments that abide by the gold
standard or delegate control of the money supply to an independent central bank
with a preference for tight monetary policy.
The only exception to this that a mainstream economist might make is for the
case of "debt" in the form of currency. The seigniorage revenue
generated by currency (zero-interest debt), however, is typically considered to
be small potatoes. Consider the United States, for example. Let's
interpret Das currency. Currency in circulation is presently around $1.7
trillion, almost 10% of GDP. So let's set (D/Y) = 0.10, R = 1,
and n = 1.05 in equation [*]. If I've done my math correctly, I
get (S/Y) = 0.0025, or (1/4)% of GDP. That's about $100 billion. This
may not sound like "small potatoes" to you and me, but it is for a
government whose expenditures in 2018 totaled about $4 trillion.
The New and Modern Monetarist View
I think of "monetarists" as those who view money and banking as critical
factors in determining macroeconomic activity. I'm thinking, for example, of
people like Friedman, Tobin, Wallace, Williamson and Wright (old and
new monetarists) on the mainstream side and, for example, Godley, Minksy, Wray,
Fullwiler on the MMT (and other heterodox) side. A common ground
shared by new/modern monetarists is the view of treasury debt as a form of
money; i.e., the difference between (say) U.S. Treasury debt and Federal
Reserve money is more of degree than in kind. Consider, for example, the
following two objects:
Can you spot the
difference? The first one was issued by the U.S. Treasury and the second
one by the Federal Reserve (the promised redemption for silver has long since
been suspended). The Fed is said to "monetize the debt" when it
replaces the top bill with the bottom bill. Is it any wonder why the BoJ cannot
create inflation by swapping zero-interest BoJ reserves for zero-interest JGBs?
(In case you're interested, see my piece here.)
In any case, rightly or wrongly, U.S. government policy presently renders the
treasury bill illiquid (in the sense that it cannot easily be used to make
payments). Of course, while the treasury bill no longer exists in physical
form, every U.S. person can acquire the electronic version of (interest-bearing)
T-bills at www.treasurydirect.gov. Just don't expect to be able to pay
your rent or groceries with your treasury accounts any time soon. (Though, as I
have argued elsewhere, it would be a simple matter to integrate treasury direct
accounts with a real-time gross settlement payment system.)
But even if treasury securities cannot be used to make everyday payments, they
are still liquid in the sense of being readily convertible into money on
secondary markets (and maybe one day, on a Fed standing repo facility, as Jane
Ihrig and I suggest here and here). USTs are used widely as
collateral in credit derivative and repo markets -- they constitute a form of
wholesale money. Because they are safe and liquid securities, they can trade at
a premium. A high price means a low yield and, in particular, R <
n is a distinct possibility for these types of securities.
In fact, R < n seems to be the typical case for the United States.
The only exception in
this sample is in the early 1980s -- the consequence of Volcker's attempt to
reign in inflation.
But if this is the case, then the mainstream view has long neglected a source
of seigniorage revenue beyond that generated by currency. Low-yielding debt can
also serve as a revenue device, as made clear by condition [*] above. How much
is this added seigniorage revenue worth to the U.S. government?
Let's do the arithmetic. For the United States, the (gross) debt-to-GDP ratio
is now about 105%, so let's set (D/Y) = 1.0. Let's be optimistic
here and assume that the average yield on USTs going forward will average
around 2%, so R = 1.02. As before, assume NGDP growth of 5%, or n =
1.05. Condition [*] then yields (S/Y) = 0.03, or 3% of GDP. That's
about $600 billion.
$600 billion is considerably more than $100 billion, but it's still small
relative to an expenditure of $4 trillion. And, indeed, since the budget
deficit is presently running at around $800 billion, there seems little scope
to increase it without inducing inflationary pressure. (Note: by "increase
it" I mean increase it relative to GDP. In the examples above, the
debt and deficit all grow with GDP at 5% per year).
Conclusion
What does this mean for fiscal policy going forward? The main conclusion is
that the present rate of deficit spending and high level of debt-to-GDP is not
something to be alarmed about (especially with inflation running below 2%). The
national debt can, will, and probably should continue to grow indefinitely
along with the economy. What matters more is how expenditures are directed and
how taxes are collected. Of course, this should be done with an eye to keeping
long-term inflation in check.
What deserves our immediate attention, in my view, is a re-examination of the
mechanisms through which government spending (when, where and how much) is
determined. This is not the place to get into details, but suffice it to say
that one should hope that our elected representatives have a capacity to reason
effectively, have a broad understanding of history, are willing to listen, and
do not view humility and compromise as four-letter words or signs of personal
weakness. If we don't have this, then we have much deeper problems to deal with
than the national debt or deficits.
Once the spending priorities have been established, the question of finance
needs to be addressed. If the level of spending is less than 2% of GDP, then
explicit taxes can be set to zero--seigniorage revenue should suffice. However,
if we're talking 20% of GDP then tax revenue is necessary (at least, if the
desired inflation target is to remain at 2%). If the tax system is inefficient
and cannot be changed, this may mean cutting back on desired programs. Ideally,
of course, the tax system could be redesigned to minimize inefficiencies and
distortions. But tax considerations are likely always to remain in some form
and, because this is the case, they should be taken into consideration when
evaluating the net social payoff to any new expenditure program.